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Abstract
The dual track approach to market liberalization has been widely recognized as the
key to the success of the Chinese economic reform. In this paper we study the eﬀec-
tiveness of this strategy in economic environments where the status quo government
control is incomplete. We show that in a dynamic context intertemporal arbitrage will
emerge, potentially resulting in eﬃciency losses and/or adverse distributional eﬀects.
Only when the status quo involves both price and quantity interventions by the gov-
ernment can dual track liberalization maintain its appeal. Our analysis thus suggests
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11 Introduction
Economic reforms are likely to create losers and too often the diﬃculties involved in iden-
tifying and compensating adversely aﬀected individuals have made major policy changes
impossible. For this reason, the dual–track approach implemented in the Chinese economic
reforms should be of great interests to policy makers. As Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000)
have shown, this mechanism has the potential not only to obtain an eﬃcient allocation
of resources, but more importantly to do so without creating losers. Some observers have
concluded that the “dual–track approach is perhaps the most important aspect of Chinese
reforms since it was, at the time, an innovative solution to the political constraints on the
direction and speed of reform”(International Finance Corporation (2000)). Indeed, dual
track–like reforms are being attempted in other economic environments. One interesting
example is represented by the recent reform of the Italian labor market, in which older work-
ers are kept under existing tenure contracts, while new personnel can be hired according
to temporary, short term arrangements. Similarly, the proposed overhaul of the US social
security system contains features of a dual–track mechanism in which current retirees are
promised unchanged beneﬁts, while younger workers would be allowed to invest in personal
accounts.
There is, however, a critical institutional diﬀerence between centrally planned economies
and market economies. While in the former government control completely dictates almost
all economic decisions, in the latter government control is at best incomplete. That is,
despite government interventions, economic decisions by private agents continue to play a
role in determining the resource allocation. It is then natural to ask whether the welfare
implications of the dual–track mechanism are the same in these diﬀerent environments.
The dual–track reform strategy can improve eﬃciency without creating losers because
it preserves all the existing rents throughout the reform process. However, in economies
where government control is incomplete, the anticipation of a policy change may well induce
rational agents to distort their pre-reform behaviors in order to maximize the very rents
that the dual–track mechanism tries to maintain.1 This pre-reform distortion will instead
1Given that the purpose of a dual–track mechanism is to ‘build consensus’ for a policy change, dual
track–like reforms carried out in countries with a democratic tradition have been the subject of vibrant
discussions. The recent debate on the reform of the social security system in the US is one obvious example.
Even in China, the question of whether the price reform should proceed in a dual track fashion has been the
1not arise in centrally planned economies because of complete government control. For this
reason, to fully understand the impact of a dual–track mechanism in the context of a market
economy, we need to consider not only how the reform aﬀects the resource allocation after it
has taken place, but also how the expectation of a future reform aﬀects the allocation before
its introduction.
To this end we extend the analysis by Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) in two ways. First,
while Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) have implicitly assumed that in the status quo gov-
ernment ﬁat completely dictates both quantities produced and consumed as well as prices,
we allow the status quo intervention to be incomplete, in the sense that in the ﬁrst period
either quantities or prices can be adjusted in response to the forthcoming reform.2 Second,
we move beyond their static framework by introducing a simple dynamic model involving
two periods, where a dual–track reform taking place in the second period is anticipated in
the ﬁrst.
The basic question we address in this paper is whether, taking into account that the
reform will have eﬀects on the allocations in both periods, the dual–track liberalization
continues to be both eﬃciency–enhancing and Pareto improving as compared to the status
quo. This is an important issue for a policy maker eager to introduce change with ‘no
pain’. In particular, if the anticipation eﬀect results in the exacerbation of the status quo
distortions, then the policy maker will face a dilemma. Either he will be able to manipulate
the public’s expectations, so that the dual track reform will come as a ‘surprise’, or he will
need to look for devices allowing him to make his commitment not to use a dual track
reform credible. Our analysis therefore highlights some important caveats to the broader
applicability of the mechanism analyzed by Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up the model,
while section 3 analyzes the second–period allocation and reproduces the central result of
Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000). We study how the ﬁrst period allocation responds to the
anticipated reform in section 4. In section 5, we evaluate, from a dynamic perspective, the
subject of a lively debate both in the policy circle and among the general public. (See for instance ‘Peking
polls the masses on prices’ in the Financial Times, August 22 1985.)
2Our analysis diﬀers from Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992). They show that in a static setting a dual
track reform may lead to an eﬃciency loss when the separation of the two tracks is not well enforced. We
take instead a dynamic perspective and the potential source of additional distortions is the intertemporal
arbitrage activities of the agents.
2welfare eﬀect of the anticipated dual–track liberalization. The analysis is carried out in
two steps. Section 5.1 considers the case in which the status quo policy involves only one
intervention, while Section 5.2 investigates the scenario where the status quo policy concerns
multiple dimensions. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
To introduce our discussion in the simplest possible framework, we follow Lau, Qian, and
Roland (2000) and use a partial equilibrium setup, in which a continuum of buyers and
producers each demand and supply one and only one unit of a commodity.3 All agents are
price-takers. Diﬀerently from Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000), our model has two–periods.
In the ﬁrst, the market is distorted by a government policy that might involve direct price
setting, quotas, taxes or subsidies. In the second the government implements a reform
aimed at removing this distortion. Buyers’ preferences are time separable and invariant, and
producers’ costs remain constant over time. Both sets of agents have a discount factor ±,
and the commodity is assumed to be perishable.
To minimize potential opposition, the government introduces the reform in a dual track
fashion in the second period. As a result, a “market” and a “regulated” track emerge in the
second period. In the former, agents are free to enter new exchanges. In the latter, private
agents are instead assigned rights and obligations derived from the ﬁrst period transactions
carried out under the original government policy. That is, if private agents carried out an
exchange of a given quantity at a certain price in the ﬁrst period, the very same transaction
will be enforced in the second period. As an example, think about the case of a labor market
in which, in the ﬁrst period labor contracts between workers and employers are governed
by a Union agreement specifying the wage rate. In the second period, the government
introduces a reform, which allows newly hired workers to be paid a (lower) market wage
rate, but at the same time requires employers to continue to pay the same union-set wage
rate to those workers they have previously employed. In other words, a dual track approach
requires contracts governing ﬁrst period transactions to continue to be enforced in the second
period.4At the same time, the reform calls for the establishment of a market track, where
3For a general equilibrium analysis of the dual–track mechanism, see Lau, Qian, and Roland (1997).
4In addition, if the original government policy involved a transfer (i.e. a tax or a subsidy) to an agent in
3parties can carry out transactions at the prevailing equilibrium market price.
Key to our analysis is that private agents anticipate in the ﬁrst period the implementation
of the dual track reform in the second. As a result, the equilibrium resource allocation in
the ﬁrst period is determined not only by the original distortionary policy, but also by the
anticipated second period reform. Therefore, when evaluating dual track liberalization, we
need to consider its welfare implications over both periods. Speciﬁcally, we will compare
the equilibrium allocation under dual track liberalization to the status quo (i.e., the no
liberalization outcome). We say that the reform is eﬃciency–enhancing when it dominates
the status quo from the point of view of social welfare, i.e. the total (discounted) surplus
over the two periods is greater under the reform than under the status quo. Furthermore,
dual track liberalization achieves a Pareto improvement over the status quo if the total
(discounted) surplus of each private agent over the two periods is greater under dual track
than under the status quo.
3 The Second Period Resource Allocation
Our analysis of the second period equilibrium reproduces that of Lau, Qian, and Roland
(2000). To proceed, it is useful to distinguish between two sets of agents: those who have
transacted in the ﬁrst period and those who have not. Previously active agents must carry
out their original transactions as required by the dual track liberalization mechanism. By
doing so, the dual track mechanism ensures that in the second period no one can be worse
oﬀ as compared to the status quo. As in Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000), we further assume
the dual track mechanism allows agents to carry out these transactions by taking advantage
of the existence of a market track without actually producing or using the commodity. For
instance, an employer can second his former employee (whom he is obliged to hire at the
union wage rate) to another employer at the market wage rate, instead of actually using him.
By granting previously active agents access to the market track, the dual track mechanism
enables them to arbitrage between the market price and the marginal cost (or marginal
willingness to pay) of the good/service they are obliged to provide (or entitled to consume).
For instance, by seconding his employee at the market wage rate, an employer avoids using
the ﬁrst period, the same payment will be made in the second.
4the employee whenever his marginal beneﬁt from doing so is lower than the market wage
rate. As a result, the overall quantity actually consumed in the two tracks is the result of
the behavior of those buyers with a marginal willingness to pay larger than P e. Similarly,
for a given P e, the total quantity actually produced in the two tracks will be generated only
by those producers with a marginal cost lower than P e. This implies that in equilibrium the
free-market price must be at the level where the marginal cost equals the marginal willingness
to pay, independently of the original government policy.
We summarize our observations in the following Lemma, which reproduces Proposition
1 in Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000):
Lemma 1 Regardless of the ﬁrst period government policy, dual track liberalization attains
the ﬁrst best allocation in the second period. Moreover, the equilibrium price in the market
track is the same as the competitive equilibrium price.
4 Expectations and Intertemporal Arbitrage
In a dynamic context, the ﬁrst period allocation depends on the private agents’ expectations
about the second period reform. Translating the static discussion of Lau, Qian, and Roland
(2000) to our dynamic framework, we allow the reform to be anticipated, while in their
analysis the liberalization comes as a “surprise”, so that the ﬁrst period outcome is not
aﬀected by the ensuing liberalization. If the reform is anticipated, private agents are induced
to strategically modify their behavior in the ﬁrst period in order to take advantage of new
arbitrage opportunities. These opportunities arise because dual track liberalization creates
two tracks in the second period, and agents who have engaged in transactions in the ﬁrst
period are entitled to exchange in the regulated track in the second period. Since the prices
prevailing in the two tracks may very well diﬀer, agents will attempt to take advantage of
such diﬀerences by modifying their ﬁrst period behavior. We refer to these activities as
inter-temporal arbitrage. For instance, if workers realize that they can lock up the Union-set
wage rate in the second period by entering a labor contract in the ﬁrst period, they will be
more willing to supply their labor services if the Union-set wage rate is substantially higher
than the market rate in the second period. And the opposite is true for employers.
Figure 1 illustrates how inter-temporal arbitrage alters the agents’ ﬁrst-period behavior
in a closed economy. S0 and D0 represent the ﬁrst period “strategic” supply and demand
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Figure 1: First period strategic demand and supply in a closed economy
derived from these inter-temporal arbitrage activities. As the ﬁgure shows, the strategic
demand rotates around the (non-strategic) demand D at the second period equilibrium price
in the market track which, according to Lemma 1, is equal to P e. Similarly, the strategic
supply rotates around the (non-strategic) supply S at P e. To understand how S0 and D0 are
derived, let us consider the buyers’ decision (the problem faced by the producers is similar),
starting with the case in which a buyer’s marginal willingness to pay (MV ) is higher than
P e. From Lemma 1, we know that he will always consume in the second period. If he enters
a transaction in the ﬁrst period, his total payoﬀ for the two periods will be
(1 + ±)(MV ¡ P):
given that he is locked into the ﬁrst period price P. If he does not enter a transaction in
the ﬁrst period, he will be able to trade in the market track at the price P e in the second
period. Thus his total payoﬀ will be
±(MV ¡ P
e):
The buyer is indiﬀerent about whether or not to carry out a transaction in the ﬁrst period
6when
(1 + ±)(MV ¡ P) = ±(MV ¡ P
e);
or P =
MV + ±P e
1 + ±
:
Since each buyer is assumed to use at most one unit of the commodity, each point on D in
Figure 1 represents the marginal willingness to pay for a particular buyer. Thus, when ± = 1
for example, a buyer with marginal willingness equal to a will have a “strategic willingness
to pay” in the ﬁrst period equal to b = a+c
2 .
Suppose, on the other hand, that a buyer’s marginal willingness to pay is instead lower
than P e. As we have discussed earlier, such a buyer will never actually consume the product
in the second period, but will instead sell the commodity back to the market track5. For
such a buyer, transacting in the ﬁrst period leads to a (positive or negative) proﬁt P e ¡ P
in the second, since he can use the market track to fulﬁll his obligation. Consequently, the
total payoﬀ for such a buyer to transact in the ﬁrst period is
MV ¡ P + ±(P
e ¡ P):
If, on the other hand, the buyer does not engage in a transaction in the ﬁrst period, he will
be free from any obligation to trade in the second, and will not enter in a transaction at that
time since MC > P e. Consequently, a buyer with a marginal willingness to pay lower than
P e is indiﬀerent between buying or not in the ﬁrst period at the price P when
MV ¡ P + ±(P
e ¡ P) = 0
or P =
MV + ±P e
1 + ±
:
In Figure 1, a buyer with the marginal willingness to pay g has a “strategic willingness to
pay” f =
e+g
2 when ± = 1. We can summarize our previous discussion in the following
Lemma 2 Let P be the ﬁrst period price and P e be the second period equilibrium price in
the market track. The ﬁrst period supply in anticipation of the dual track liberalization in
5In the case of a labor market, this means that an employer, who is compelled to hire his old employees
with the value of marginal product of labor lower than the market wage rate, will second these workers.
7the second period is given by
S
0¡1(Q) =
S¡1(Q) + ±P e
1 + ±
and the corresponding ﬁrst period demand is given by
D
0¡1(Q) =
D¡1(Q) + ±P e
1 + ±
:
5 The Dynamic Welfare Implications of Dual Track
Reform
We are now ready to evaluate whether, from a dynamic perspective, anticipated dual track
liberalization is eﬃciency enhancing and Pareto improving as compared to the status quo.
As it turns out, the answer to this question depends on whether the original government
policy involves an intervention only in one or in multiple dimensions. Instead of providing
an exhaustive analysis of the various possible types of government intervention, we illus-
trate our arguments by means of three examples. First we consider a price setting policy,
and then a quantity restriction accompanied by price setting with and without involuntary
participation/exclusion.6
5.1 Single-Dimension Intervention: Price Setting
Suppose the government ﬁxes the price at P in the ﬁrst period, and assume that this policy
results in excessive demand (that is, the supply is binding). In this case, the second period
market price P e must be higher than P, as Figure 2 illustrates. In the ﬁrst period, if
agents do not anticipate future policy changes, the quantity exchanged will be Q1, so that
S¡1(Q1) = P. When a dual track liberalization is instead expected, sellers have an incentive
to withhold their sales in the ﬁrst period, in order to avoid being locked into a contract ﬁxing
the low price P. At the same time, buyers have an additional incentive to transact in the ﬁrst
period so as to lock up the low price P. This implies that the ﬁrst period excessive demand
persists under the anticipated dual track liberalization. Let Qd
1 be the equilibrium quantity
transacted in the ﬁrst period under the anticipated dual track liberalization. Following
6For a more complete analysis, see Che and Facchini (2004).
8Lemma 2, Qd
1 is given by
P =
S¡1(Qd
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Figure 2: Price setting with binding supply
The exacerbated shortage means that, as compared to the status quo, some additional
buyers are rationed out and hence become worse oﬀ in the ﬁrst period. Moreover, because
they are rationed out in the ﬁrst period, they will have to purchase the commodity at the
price P e > P in the second. Thus these users must be worse-oﬀ as compared to the status
quo, even inter–temporally. Dual track liberalization can therefore not be Pareto improving
in the dynamic sense.
As it exacerbates the shortage, inter-temporal arbitrage induces an additional eﬃciency
loss in the ﬁrst period as compared to the status quo. However, this loss must be weighted
against the eﬃciency gain achieved by dual track liberalization in the second period. We
9derive the following conclusion, which holds also for the case of binding demand:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the government status quo policy is price setting. Then antic-
ipated dual track liberalization is never Pareto improving. From the point of view of social
welfare, it is dominated by the status quo if
±(Q
e ¡ Q1) · Q1 ¡ Q
d
1: (1)
Proof. We only need to prove the eﬃciency result since we have already shown that an-
ticipated dual track liberalization does not lead to a Pareto improvement. Notice that the
eﬃciency loss in the ﬁrst period is bounded below by (D¡1(Q1)¡S¡1(Q1))(Q1¡Qd
1), whereas
the eﬃciency gain in the second is bounded above by (D¡1(Q1)¡S¡1(Q1))(Qe¡Q1). There-
fore, the dual track is not eﬃciency enhancing if ±(Qe ¡ Q1) · Q1 ¡ Qd
1. QED.
Proposition 1 states that, from a dynamic perspective, the anticipated removal of a price-
setting policy in a dual–track fashion is welfare–reducing rather than welfare enhancing if
condition (1) is satisﬁed.7
5.2 Dual Intervention
Our discussion so far has shown that dual track liberalization will not be both eﬃciency
enhancing and Pareto improving in a dynamic context if the status quo policy involves an
intervention on a single dimension. The appeal of dual track liberalization can be reestab-
lished however when in the status quo the original intervention involves instead both prices
and quantities.8 As an example of this situation consider a labor market where in the sta-
tus quo all employment contracts specify a union-set wage rate, and the domestic market is
closed to immigrant workers. A dual track liberalization will then result in current employees
7If there is a supply shortage, condition 1 is satisﬁed as long as the supply is linear. To see this, substituting






1+± , we get S¡1(Q1) ¡ S¡1(Qd
1) =
±(S¡1(Qe)¡S¡1(Q1)), which reduces to Q1¡Qd
1 = ±(Qe¡Q1), i.e., condition (1) when the supply is linear.
8This was the case in centrally planned economies like China or the former Soviet Union where almost all
product markets saw the planning authority determining output targets to speciﬁc production units, as well
as ﬁxing their prices. Likewise, many developing countries used to follow import substitution development
strategies, involving the exclusion of foreign competitors on the one hand and the introduction of measures
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Figure 3: Domestic price control together with exclusion of foreign suppliers
being maintained at the union-set wage rate, while other workers, including migrants, will
be active on a market track where wages are determined completely by supply and demand.
More generally, we illustrate our argument considering a small open economy for which the
status quo policy involves price setting in the domestic market, which is closed to foreign
competition (i.e. no immigrants are admitted in the country in the original equilibrium).
Notice that this is a special case for what we will generally refer to as involuntary exclu-
sion/participation. Here foreign competitors are involuntarily excluded from the domestic
market thanks to the status quo government policy.
Let P be the ﬁrst period price, which has been set higher than the world price P w
leading to excessive demand. Figure 3 illustrates the outcome when dual track liberalization
is expected to be implemented in the second period. As discussed earlier, the ﬁrst period
strategic demand D0 rotates around the the ﬁrst period actual demand D at P e, the second
period equilibrium price for the market track, and the same will happen for the ﬁrst period
strategic supply S0. Diﬀerently from the single intervention case, the equilibrium price in the
market track will now be determined in international markets, so that P e = P w. Accordingly,
in spite of the excessive demand in the ﬁrst period, dual track liberalization leads to an
equilibrium price in the market track lower than the ﬁrst period price, i.e. P e < P. As a
11result, sellers are more willing to engage in a transaction in the ﬁrst period, while buyers
tend to demand less and this helps to alleviate, rather than exacerbate, the shortage created
by price ﬁxing. The analysis for the case in which P < P e and there is excessive supply in
the ﬁrst period is analogous, and the next proposition summarizes our discussion:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the status quo policy is domestic price ﬁxing, combined with an
import quota. Let P be the domestic target price ﬁxed by the government. Then, domestic
cum trade liberalization is eﬃciency enhancing and Pareto improving if and only if one of
the following two conditions holds:
P
e > P and S
0(P) ¸ D(P) (2)
P
e < P and D
0(P) ¸ S(P) (3)
Proof. We ﬁrst establish the suﬃciency for condition (3) using Figure 3 as an illustration.
Since P e < P, demand decreases and supply increases because of arbitrage, and in particular
D0(P) < D(P). Furthermore, given that the demand is larger than the supply, i.e. D0(P) ¸





0(P)g ¸ minfS(P);D(P)g = Q
Since the price does not change and the expansion of output is voluntary for both buyers
and sellers at the margin, all agents must be weakly better oﬀ. We now turn to the necessary
condition. Suppose that P e < P, but D0(P) < S(P). Then Qd
1 < Q1 and hence some buyers
will be rationed out as a result of such arbitrage. The same logic applies to condition (2).
QED.
Proposition 2 states that dual track liberalization is both eﬃciency enhancing and Pareto
improving either when there is excessive supply in the ﬁrst period but dual track liberalization
leads to a price increase, or when there is excessive demand in the ﬁrst period but dual track
liberalization leads to a price reduction. Notice that the two scenarios are possible only
because the initial policy distorts not only the price but also the quantity.
As suggested earlier, the scenario analyzed above is a speciﬁc version of involuntary ex-
clusion/particiation. More generally, we denote by involuntary exclusion those situations in
12which an agent would be willing to undertake an exchange at the prevailing price, but it is
not allowed to do so ex imperio, i.e. as a result of a prohibition by the authorities. Com-
mon examples are import quotas or voluntary export restraints, entry barriers, politically or
ideologically motivated restrictions etc. Similarly, by involuntary participation, we refer to
situations where agents would not be willing to engage in a transaction given the prevailing
price, but are forced to do so by government ﬁat, as was often observed in centrally planned
economies. The consequence of involuntary participation/exclusion is similar to the foreclo-
sure of the domestic market to foreign competition: excessive demand (or supply) in the ﬁrst
period can co-exist with the post-liberalization price reduction (or increase respectively).
Indeed, Proposition 2 can be extended to include situation in which the original govern-
ment intervention involves both price setting and a general form of involuntary participa-
tion/exclusion. Let e S and f D respectively be the total supply and demand by agents who
either involuntarily or voluntarily engage in transactions under the status quo. We illustrate
these functions in Figure 4 where we assume for simplicity that all users choose voluntarily
whether to transact. In Figure 4, some producers with very high marginal cost are forced
to supply in the status quo. These producers are represented by the leftmost portion of e S.
The rest of the producers, represented by the monotonic portion of e S, make supply deci-
sions voluntarily. This is a typical phenomenon in a centrally planned economy, where the
government may order high cost producers (such as state-owned enterprises) to deliver the
commodity simply because it has no knowledge of their true marginal cost (Lau, Qian, and
Roland (2000)). Lacking information on the fundamentals of the economy, the planner sets
the price at an arbitrary level P which in our example happens to generate an excess supply,
in the sense that e S(P) > f D(p). Notice that the free-market price P e that prevails in the
market track in the second period bears no relationship with the price at which e S = f D.
This is because an arbitrary number of producers are involuntarily forced to participate in
transactions due to the original government intervention.
Since P e and the price at which f D = e S are not related, it becomes possible for P e > P
while e S(P) > f D(P). When P e > P, intertemporal arbitrage implies that the supply will
decrease and the demand will increase in the ﬁrst period. However, because e S(P) > f D(P),
it is possible for the ﬁrst period voluntary transaction to expand as a result of this arbitrage,
and hence e Qd
1 > e Q. Since the increment in transaction is voluntary and the ﬁrst period
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Figure 4: Price control and involuntary participation/exclusion
liberalization is also eﬃciency–enhancing. A similar argument can be made with respect to
the case when P e < P and f D(P) > e S(P). We conclude:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the government sets the price with infra-marginal agents par-
ticipating in the exchange involuntarily. Then anticipated dual track liberalization is Pareto
improving if and only if one of the following holds:
a. P e > P and e S0(P) ¸ f D(P)
b. P e < P and f D0(P) ¸ e S(P)
Proof. The argument is identical to the proof of Proposition 2 once we redeﬁne D as f D,
and S as e S. QED.
Considering Figure 4, if e S0(P) < f D(P), the transaction in the ﬁrst period will decrease
when the liberalization is anticipated. Consequently, some additional users will be rationed
out in the ﬁrst period and hence made worse oﬀ. They will be made worse oﬀ in the
second period as compared to the status quo because they have to pay the free-market
price P e > P if they choose to transact. This means that a Pareto improvement cannot be
achieved. However, the liberalization could remain eﬃciency enhancing, since the eﬃciency
gains from removing involuntary participation can be arbitrarily large.
146 Conclusions
The remarkable success of China’s transition from a centrally planned to a market economy
raises the question of the extent to which the lessons from the Chinese experience can be
applied elsewhere. In this paper, we have addressed this issue by examining the broader
implementability of the dual–track approach to market liberalization. We begin our analysis
with a careful deﬁnition of “elsewhere”, that is economies where policy interventions do not
completely dictate prices and quantities and market signals continue to play a role. In this
setting we have argued that a dynamic perspective should be taken to evaluate the welfare
implications of a dual–track liberalization.
Extending the static analysis carried out by Lau, Qian, and Roland (2000) to a simple
two–period model, we have shown that a dual–track liberalization can remain both eﬃciency–
enhancing and Pareto–improving from a dynamic perspective when the initial intervention
involves both price–setting as well as quantity restrictions. We have also learned that, when
the original policy involves a single intervention, dual track liberalization loses its appeal
and might even lead to the exacerbation of the ineﬃciencies present in the status quo. Thus,
our analysis oﬀers some important lessons to policy makers interested in reforms without
losers. A dual track approach can be eﬀective as long as the policy change is implemented
as a surprise.9
When this is not possible and the status quo does not involve the government’s control
of both prices and quantities, a policy maker will need to credibly commit himself to not
implementing a dual track reform.
It is worth highlighting that our analysis does not contradict the conclusion of Lau, Qian,
and Roland (2000). In fact, our discussion allows us to identify one of the key factors in
the success of the Chinese reforms. That is, China began as a centrally planned economy,
where the planning authority completely controlled prices and quantities, thus eliminating
any possibility for agents to react to the forthcoming reform. Accounting for this response
becomes instead crucial when a dual track reform is carried out in a market economy.
9Equivalently, the dual track approach could also be eﬀective if the contract to be enforced is one signed
in the distant past, so that agents are not able to strategically react to the announced policy change. Of
course, enforcing old contracts presents additional diﬃculties – i.e. transactions records may not be readily
available – and at the same time transactions carried out in the distant past may not reﬂect agents’ current
preferences or cost conditions.
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